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Summary 
1. hpravimg Democracy 
Thinkers such as Schwpeter and Dahl have portrayed dmocracy a a free 
political market. In that market, the electorate vote for the politicim tl~ey 
think will defend their spiritual md material interests best. In this way, a 
gaverment is chosen or a parliament, which in Iturn produces a gavetam- 
ment . 
According to these authors, in a democracy political decisions are not 
taken by a majority or a minority, but by minorities. These must reach 
agreement among themselves in order to mdce majority decisio~~s. Minor- 
ities are valuable inasmuch as they constitute each other" potential allies. 
They must therefore take each other's interests into account. In practice, 
this may offer them even better protection than my well-drafted constitu- 
tion. However, constitutional rules are importmlt as well. They are the 
expression of a consemus on a number of basic values, the framework 
within which politics is conducted. 
This is a fairly optimistic portrayal of democracy: in a society a 
number of rules are established, which safeguard a free political market of 
supply and demand. As a result, the well-known free-market invisible hand 
can optimally realize the political desires md preferences of its citizens. 
During the nineteen-seventies, Dahl established that in Western demo- 
cracies it was not only the invisible hand that remained invisible, but alslo 
the optimum redizatian of these political desires and preferences. A small 
number of persons in society grew richer and richer, whereas the minority 
became poorer and poorer. Dah1 looked for an explanation and felt to have 
found it in the economic ineq~ality of citizens. This inequality is brought 
abaut by private enterprise, which in the Western world has degenerated 
into "corporate capitalism.'This form of entrepreneurship creates major 
differences between citizens as to affluence, status, bowledge, control 
over infarmation auld propaganda, and access to political leaders, which 
does not make for very fair trading in the political mketplalce either. 
Strong customers j,ostle the other customers in front of the stalls and 
demand the best merchandise. Dahl proposes a radical remedy to make an 
end to these economic and political iniquities. A "right to democracy 
within f i m "  must be establbhed. Businesses must be demacraticdly 
m m g e d  from within. This can be best achieved, in Ddd's view, by 
converting them into caopembves, in which the workers have become 
voting members. The economic and therefore also the ploditicaI inequalities 
between citiziem will automticallly decrease. 
Not all democratic problems are solve$ by making enterprises more 
d,emocratic. Carole: Pateman, Wolfgang Beck and others have pointed out 
that democracy is a learning process. O d y  through actual participation and 
campaigning will people become politically emancipated citizens. Com- 
bined with Robert Dahl" proposals, this could lead to a society of polit- 
ically assertive people of equal standing. Customers in the free political 
marketplace woulld ensure that other customers did not jump the queue. In 
front of the stalls affairs would be conducted fairly. But that is not all. 
What happens behind the counters? The traders, that is the politicians md 
the officials, have their own interests in public administration, such as 
enforcement, good relations with their colleagues and their careers. En 
order to serve tl~ese interests, it is often more advantageous for them to be 
on good terms with their superiors, colleagues and subordinates than to 
compete for the favour of the electorate or public approval. This may 
easily lead to deals behind the counters that substantially restrict the 
options of the customers in front of these. 
Efforts to improve our democracy must therefore be made on three 
fronts: economic inequality between citizens must be pushed back, which 
at the same time will enhance political equality. In addition, the disparity 
in knowledge and skills between (groups of) citizens must be reduced. And 
thirdly: public administration itself whose administrative and bureaucratic 
organization should afford a fair chance of realizing the desires and ideas 
of rlae citizens. This dissertation deals with the third front. It contains m 
inivestigariol~ into the accessibility of government documents, the views an 
administrative loyalty and the citizen" opportunities to be heard through 
participation, referenda and people's initiatives, followed by the author's 
proposals to grant the population Inore control, more direct influence on 
pubaic administratian and rnore means of redressing it. Hence more direct 
democracy. 
Since the second half of tlae nineteenth century, public adn~inistration Eras 
gained in importance. This does not mean publicity of administration, 
however. As late as the sixties of this century, a global review movement 
prompted a deblate in the Netherlands in which the principIe af publicity of 
government was advocated. The 1970 publication of the report 
"Openbaaxheid q~lemheid'~ (Publicity openness) by the Bieshewel ConxPlis- 
sion is a milestone. In this report, it was proposed that the legislator, far 
kbe sake of edmcirrg democracy, adapt the principle of public informa- 
tion, The Commission develolped the idea inta a Bill. All i~ormation 
available to the central authorities should be public, with some express 
exceptions. Also for the provincial and municipal authorities, the C o m i s -  
sion wanted publicilty of government, which was to be governed by the 
Provinces Act and )the Municipalities Act. The report by the Biesheuvel 
Commission met with much resistme, especially From the governanent 
and the Council of State. 
In 1975, the government introduced a Bill to Parliament for a Wet 
Openbaasheid Besluur (Public Information Act). This Bill features, apart 
horn a number of mandatary grolurrds for denying access to infarmstion, 
also discretionary grounds foe rehsd ,  which are to be farther regulated by 
Administrative Order. The Bill imposes a duty on the mtltorities to provide 
infomation of their own motion '"henever this is in the interest of proper 
and democratic administration. I' 
Documents for hkmal Consdfadon 
The government presents the Lower Chmber with a draft Administrative 
Order to further regulate the discretionary grounds for refusal. Requests 
for information contained in documents that have been drawn up for 
internal comultatian will be grmted, pursuant to a provision in this draft, 
""with the exciepition of infarmation which deals with: 
a. data being processed or, although complete, presenting an inaccu- 
rate picture wilthout being complemented by dditional data; 
b.personal policy apj~lions of ministers, administrators or officials, 
providing that information 011 the policy alieernativcs coilrained in 
these documents be disclosed. '' 
The Dutcl~ Lower Chamber feit that the provision was sufficiently impor- 
tant to be irrcorporalted in the Act itself. It was tl~erefore lifted from the 
Administrative Order and placed in the Public Information Act. 
Commerciab a d  Iizdustrial Data 
Tlae geaverment felt that the cavlfiderrtiality of commercial and industrial 
data was adequately safeguarded. But the parries on the right in the Lower 
Chamber wanted absodute assurance for commerce and Industry. They 
submitted an amendmenlt, in which a new ground for secrecy was added to 
the Bill. This ground implied that c o m e r c ~ a l  and industrial data confiden- 
tially m m u ~ c a t e r d  must remain confidential in all c ae s .  The goverment 
fiercely fought the amendment during the parliamentary debate. But the 
industrial lobby groved loo p-owerful and the amendment was ado~pred~ 
Under the new ActI entrepreneurs were given the right to veto disclosure. 
me Cow@ a d  Pubdici$y of Gow~rnmenf 
The Public Infomtion Act came into effect on I May 19810. The principle 
that all administrative information is secret, apart from disclosure, is then 
exchanged for the principle that all administrative informtion is public 
domin ,  subject to non-disclosure. At first sight, this seemed a major 
change. But in practice it turned out differently. Advisory opinions 
expressed by officials, administrative memos and commercial and indus- 
trial data provided by entrepreneurs to the administration remained confi- 
dential to the public, This meant virtually all data that could be interesting 
from the point of policy influencing or policy control. The justices on the 
Council of State, whose duty it is to watch aver the application of rhle 
Publie Information Act, went even further than that by extensively inter- 
preting the grounds for secrecy. 
The New Public Iaformtion Act 
During the eighties, the legislator decided to integrate the Administrative 
Order on the publicity of government into the Public Information Act. This 
was intended to offer more lega1 cerfainEy to the citizens. Furthermore, the 
Act" ease off reference was to improve by a rearrmgement of its articles. 
Thus, a new Public Information A d  was created, which came into effect 
on 1 May 1992. 
This new Act, however, reversed the right to access public docu- 
ments considerably. 'Internal consultaticany no longer meant just consulta- 
tion within the dministrative agency, but was extended to consultation 
b&ween dministrative agencies. And whereas asunder the former Act the 
personal galicy opinions of ministers, administrators and officials were 
exempt from diaclasure, under the new Act, all opinions have been 
exempted. By virtue of the new Act, even the opinions of corporations 
(Vech$spersonm~ are ""personal " policy opinions. There are hardly any 
document8 left to which the grounds for non-disclosure in the new Public 
Infomarion Act do nor apply. For access to administrative documents in 
the Netherlands one has to fa11 back an the provisiorvs in sectorial adminis- 
trative statutes. 
During the creation of the Public Information Act there was muck, concern 
far the position of officials. Ef officials had a right, indeed perhaps even a 
duty, to disclose information which did not square with the views of their 
(p~llitical) superiors, internal relatiom would come under pressure. More- 
over, many politicians argued, our whole democratic system, with the 
inclusion of its principle of political responsibility, would be thus under- 
mined, since ministers and other figures af political authority could only be 
accountable for those statements by their oficials they controlled. This 
point of view, which is perhaps the greatest impediment to publicity of 
government, must be opposed. 
The Classical Theory 
In the nineteenth century, in general the attitude towards officials who 
spoke their mind was fairly tolerant. This changed :dn the course of the first 
decades of this century. The change is probably related to the sig~aificant 
increase in the size of public administration between 1900 and 1920. This 
increase, caused by new administrative duties, made many apprehensive. 
They became fearful of bureaucracy, which had to be restrained at all 
costs, When by 1920 in almost dl Western European countries universal 
suffrage had been introduced, there seemed to be an abvious solution, 
particularly since the industrial revolutions had been responsible far a 
rather mechanical picture of mankind. People could be introduced into the 
production process as inanimate cogs. This also held true far officials. 
They were not to think for themselves, but were to do what their (political) 
superiors told them to. The latter in turn were accountable to a parliament 
that had been elected in general elections based on universal suffrage. True 
democracy seemed feasible, even In a complex industrialized society, 
The new views on adminisltrative loyalty, formulated by the German 
jurist and sociologist Max Weber, eventuajly became the classical tlzeory. 
Also in the Netherlands, this view received much support from the 
twenties onward. 
As early as 1883, a Dutch professor of constitutional law, Buys, had 
argued that the freedom of opinion of officials cou1dl be curtailed. At that 
rime, politicians and scholars rejected this view. In 1915, a renewed effort 
was made to weaken the freedom of opinion to which officials were 
entitled. Another Dutch scholar in constitutional, law, Straycken, argued at 
that time that citizens could relinquish their enjoyment of certain fbnda- 
mental rights by contract and that "as a result of a special legal status'' the 
exercige of lone or more fuslhmental rights could be artailed or pro- 
hibited. 
In 1922, the Lower Chamber learned and accepted that the govern- 
ment had taken over Stmycken's ideas. In the years following, this view 
was allso adopted, by most constitutioinal scholars. It was reflateti in the 
c u e  law of the a ~ n i s t r a t i v e  murts. The view legitimized a new style of 
governing. It became possible to keep matters 'indloorsy by declaring them 
'hterrml administrative matters. I' 
Towar& n New Concept 
The classical theory of administrative loyalty was dready criticized before 
the Second World War by a German jurist and political scientislt, Carl 
Friedrich, who had emigrated to the United States. In his judgment, 
officials are employees with minds of their own, who can spot society's 
problems and communicate these to the political powers that be. For these 
problems, and for those put on the table by the political leaders them- 
selves, they must find creative solutions. That is their duty, which must be 
fulfilled with a sense of obligation, that is to say: skilfilly, by observing 
professional ethics and with a view to serve society. Solutions m s t  be 
worked out in consultation with the political bodies responsible and should 
only be realized upon the consent of these bodies. However, according to 
Fsiedrich, such consent does not solely depend on the odd (political) 
superior. If the superior obstmcts the matter, the official, out of the same 
sense loif obligation, but also because he enjoys the same freedom of 
expression as everyone else, may try to win the public's and the 
politicians' suppart for his views. This is equally important for democracy 
and for the quality of government-per se. 
Since the Second World War, the views on administrative loyalty have 
evdvecl considerably in political theory. Also as a result of the extreme 
obedience of officials in. Germany, first the humanistic concepttion of 
loyalty and switrsequentEy the concept of institutional citizenship emerged. 
Botkz theories reflected a renewed attention for findmental rights, 
especially as regards the freedom of conscience and the freedom of 
expression. In particular the concept of institutional citiz~enship closely 
relates to Carl Friedrich's conception of administrative responsibility. 
In the secolzd half of the fifties, rhe Dutch government acknowledged 
that, in principle, fundmental rights also apply to officials. Jurists felt 
uneasy about the idea, but from the eighties onward, most legal scholars 
acknowledged that, in principle, fundmental rights are also applicable to 
officials. However, both government and legal schoPars were just going 
through the motions. They could not envision or barely realized that the 
recognition that fundamental rights also applied to officials would have an 
impact on administrative law as such. The possibility to curtail fundamcn- 
tal rights was incarporated i n b  the Constitution in 1983. The restriction 
itself was laid down in I988 in Article 125a of the Ambtenarenwet (Gov- 
ernment Officials Act). Pursuant to this article, officials may not express 
their thoughts or feelings, if "the proper fulfilment of their duties er the 
proper functioning of publie service cannot be reasonably ensured.'"n the 
spirit of the article, on several occasions the Dutch administrative courts 
have curtailed the freedom of expressio~~ of officials, although recent case 
law does seem to offer officials a little more rooin for expression. This 
should not be construed as a breakthrough, however. 
In reality, the legal relationship between the official and the adminis- 
tration has hardly changed in the Netherlands since the twenties. In fact, 
the "classical'2heory no longer adhered to by political and public adminis- 
tration scientists since the Second World War, has been matter-of-factly 
incorporated into Dutch administrative law governing officials. 
7'%e Meorzing of 'Loyal OfficinS' 
In this dissertation, a loyal official is first and foremost an honest official. 
Both bis superiors and the general public must be sure that he does nor 
play tricks on them. Officials are constantly faced with conflicting interests 
and opposite opinions. In consequence, it will not be possible for a loyal 
official to avoid forming an opinion inn his service on what he personally, 
in view of his skills and social responsibility, feels is the most desirable 
way for the administration to act, and on the way in which he can best 
make a contribution. This opinion he is free to express to the public. He 
must, however, take into account specific statutory requirements of non- 
discloisuse md the interests defined in Article 10 of the Public Information 
Alct. His superiors will also have to accept that, in the end, the official's 
loyalty is owed to saciev. 
Public Disclosure 
Such attitude will improve access to public iniforrnatiolz. Officials will have 
their own responsibility far what they may, and may not, express in 
public. This will not Imply, however, that officials will now bring any 
dispute with their superiors into the open. As any other employee. the 
majority of officials appreciate good working relations with their bosses. 
Ody in exceptional cases will an official conclude that he must share his 
concerns or views with the general public. 
There is another effect., however, which is more important than a greater 
appormTLjlty for official& to expoess their opiniom. The new definition of 
'admirr,istrarive lqal ty '  entails that opinions of officials be publicly 
discllosd. This means that the public can request access to documents. In 
that cme, a request for disclosure of an ahinistrative icrpinrilsin can no 
longer be denid on the grounds of it being a "personal poliq opinio~n.'" 
Tlirowe Eravim a direct interest* and others, are entitled, if they so wish, to 
be infotrnecl. The: opinions of officials are not the exclusive property of 
those political office holders that happen to be in powler at the time, but 
belong to aociety as a whlole, 
This also holds true for the documented apiniom of the dministra- 
tors themselves. The public has a right to h o w  the direction in which 
office holders are steering the decisicrn-making. Only if these conditions 
are met, can: there be true democratic: control and direction.The author 
argues that Article 11 of thle h b l i c  Information Act, which employs the 
tern "personal policy opinions" as a ggarund for denying requests for 
information, should therefore be repealed. Acmss to information should 
only be denied if this were to comtitute a violation of specific legal rules, 
or where the provisions on confidentiality in Article 110 of the hb l i c  
Information Act apply. 
4. Participation 
There is a typical Dutch form of participation which is called Ympmak'. 
In tl~is dissertation, the author "promotes" " impra&' to  mean 
'consulbado~!~ between the authorities and their citizens. But not all consul- 
tation constitutes 'impraak'. A person negotiating the terms of an agree- 
ment with the authorities cannot be qualified as an 'impreker ' . The author- 
ities may not: enter into the agreement without the consent of that gersan. 
kn ~l?e case of inspmak, citizens possess no ar hardly any bargaining 
power. The authorities can take decisions without their consent. That is 
why, when testing the quality of insprmk, it is advisable to investigate 
whetlier the authorities have wanted to, hold genuine consultations. 
Co~nsultation is not just an exchange of views. An exchange of views 
is an orderly conzfrontation of the opinions and ideas of the various partici- 
pants. Consultation only exists where participants have the intention to 
reach as much a consensus on the issues as possible. 
Consultation is not d~eserving of its name if it is not conducted in 
earnest. The authorities in particular may be held accountable for affording 
tl-ue various (groups of) insprekejrs a fair and therefore a more or less equal 
chance of persuading them. It is after all the au~orh'ties who, following the 
i m p r d ,  must take the decision. 
Ynspr& is about cchnsulting citizens and residents (NdderIonders 
and imgezetene*. For t h  purposes of ttrjls dissertatbn. insprad is viewed 
as a political right. Each citizen or resident who feels himself involved in a 
particular action by the autharities, is entitled to imppa&. From the 
authorities, a willingness and the initiative to consult with them may be 
expected. They are the parries involved, which does noit neciessaxhly mean 
they are the 'interested party' ("belangSaebbende1']. A sufficient condition 
to be a '"arty inuolkved" (C"'bfraMene") is that the party has an emotional 
interest in or feels responsible for society. This does not mean that the 
whale country, the entire province or city needs to be invited to exercise 
irwpmak. It is sufficient for the authorities to obtain, the suggestions of 
those who may reasonably feel involved in a particular issue and to 
srubsequentIy opt for a considered approach. If other involved parties 
report to the authorities for insprad, they may also participate, unless 
there are good reasons to exclude them. 
Models of Consulbafian anid Externel Experts 
Granting fair and equal opportunities may entail that certain parties 
involved need to be given support. Twa types of support need to be 
distinguished in this respect: suppart enabling the party involved to 
organize as a group and support in developing an alternative scheme. The 
need for an alternative scheme may depend according $0 the consultation 
model opted for by the authorities. In administrative practice, three 
different consultation models are used. They are referred to asis: the agency 
model, the mixed model, the occupants modd. 
The agency model is the most traditional. In this model, the pol i~y  propo- 
sal which is to be presented to the administration, is drafted by an official 
or a group of officials with the possible collaboratican of external experts. 
In the various preparatory stages of policy-making, inspmek is granted to 
involved citizens and residents. These insprekers do not bear any responsi- 
bility for the eventual policy proposal submitted to the administration. If 
they request funding from the authorities in order to stage an alternative 
investigation or to formulate an alternative proposal, they are in principle 
entitled to such. 
The mixed model is a tmc model of cooperation. Agreements ate made 
with the parties involved about the composition of a working party or 
project group. Apart from officials, such party or group consists of the 
represerntatives of the organlmtiom involvld, It prepares, if needed with 
the support of experts, the policy proposal to be presented to the ah in is -  
tration through the agency. Also im this model, i m p r d  is granted to 
citizens and residents involved im the various stages of preparation. The 
osgmimtiions o f  involved parties share the re~p~mibility for the proposals 
of the group. There is no aewon, therefore, to provide these organizations 
with separate funding to prepare alternative proposals. In case of dispute, 
the group may agree to dcvelap two or more alternatives. This, of course, 
increases costs. 
The occupants tsmodd is a much more rare phenomenon. It can only 
function. if the occupants share similar interests. In the occupants model, 
the occupants, together with external experts, prepare a draft-decision. The 
authorities may have given them certain points of reference, but it is 
conceivable that the work is done an the bmis of premises formulated by 
the occupants themselves, premises that are not primfacie unacceptable to 
the authorities. The agency may have i~~sgraak during the preparations. 
Inasmuch as a single decision is prepared, the total costs for the project 
will not exceed those of the other procedures. 
Statutory Rules for Pnspraak'? 
Rather than regulating impmak by law, we should remove the legal 
obstacles that are now hampering laspmak procedures, By abolishing 
Article 11 of the Public Information Act and Article 125a of the Govern- 
ment Officials Act, the way will be cleared for open and frank consulta- 
tions between the administration and its citizens, in which the latter are 
givlen real and equal opportunities to influence public policy. 
Should we desire to enact a general right to dmpmak, we must 
convert the petition sight laid d o w ~  in Article 5 of the Dutch Constitution 
into a provision granting Dutch citizens asad residents a right of consulta- 
tion with the authorities. The Constitution should also list the exceptions. 
111 that case, the obligation prescribed in the Gemeentewet (M.unicipalities 
Act), the Proviszciswex {Provinces Act) and the WatemchnpsweG (Water 
Board Act) lo establish an Ordinance regulating inspmak could be abol- 
ished. 
5. Referendum and People's Initiative 
The proposals referred to so far all relate to exercising influence during the 
preparatory phases of the decision-making by public authorities. These 
proposals are intended to stimulate these public bodies to t a b  decisions 
that absserve the wishes .laif the citizens. Bult there are no guardees. If a 
public body in a specific case fails to take into account the wishes or 
objections of citizens, the latter have no means of interfering directly; only 
indirectly through national, provincial and municipal elections may they 
attempt to correct public policy. A different mews of redress is hardly 
coinaceivable in a society in which it is impassible h r  dl members to, 
convene, to jointly decide in each individual case oln l~ow the authorities 
should act or refrain from acting. In general, legislation and administration 
must be entrusted t0 people's representatives and d~ernocratica;lly appointed 
administrators. 
Nevertheless, there is a greal deal to say for direct control, where 
relevant, over administrative decisions and a direct power of redress with 
regard to the actions of administrative agencies, A direct say, exercised in 
this way, could be the tail end of the democratic system. Pn literature and 
in the political order of a number of other Western countries, this method 
of direct control come in two f o m :  referendum and people" ir'nifi-e"abwe. 
The concept of referemd~m may be defined as a general poll on a 
decision taken or being considered by a state organ on a; particular matter. 
In the case of a corrective referendum, the decision is formally taken by 
meam of a popular vote. In the case of a covzstllfative referendum, the 
papular vote is in the form of plebiscite upon which the administrative 
organ decides its course of action. The autJror rejects the c0nsultative 
referendum. In his view, a referendum should always be corrective. 
In the case of a people's initiative, part af the population puts for- 
ward a proposal for an administrative decision. In some cases, the proposal 
merely needs to be processed by the executive and parliament. However, 
if it is rejected, a popular vote must take place. 
The Debare on Referenda and People's Initiati~es 
For the past ninety years, the desirability af referenda and people's 
initiatives has been debated. After an upsurge in 11921, the year in which 
bath the government and the conservatives proposed the introduction of 
referenda, interest fizzled out. After the Second World War it flared up 
again. In its final report in 1971, the State Advisory Clomission on the 
Constitution and the Eledions Act (Kierr'esweiE) advised against a people's 
initiative, although almost half of the Commission's members wished to 
introduce the possibility of a referendum into the Constitution. The Cabinet 
and parliament ducked the issue. In 1975, only a few minor parties and a 
few parliamentariam of a major party voted in favour of the introduction 
of the possibility of referendum. 
After a par l imenhy debate: m the proposals for the 1983 general review 
of the Consitiwtion had come Eey a close, the rleferedum idea received fresh 
impetus. Pabiwlarly when a new Biesheuvel Comission in its advisory 
report to the goverment advocated the introdluction of referenda and 
people's initiatives, the number of proponents in parliment rose. In. 1988, 
a motion intend& to remove any constitutional obstacles against the 
introduction of lthe referendum, alga won the vote of the Social-Democrats. 
A swond motion intended to clear the way for the introduction of a 
people" initiative, received the support of the socialislts, but not that of the 
liberals. S o w  five years later, however, those same liberals seconded a 
motion inviting the government to introduce a Bill which includes the 
possibility of people's initiative. In August 1994, the government stated its 
willingness to look into the desirability of a referendum, 
Concrete Proposahfor ht r~dud ion  
Hn its 1985 report, the Biesheuvel Commission put forward a number of 
concrete proposals to mend the Constitution so as to include mles govern- 
ing referenda and people" initiatives, offering some basic components for 
statutory regulation. Im general it can be said that the rules suggested by 
the Commission had been well thought-out. They could be incorporated 
into the Constitution without much dificulty md be further defined in a 
statute. Nevertheless, this dissertation includes a few critical notes by the 
author. 
Referendarm Ib~rue3 
The Biesheuvel Commission proposed conclusive referenda on parliamen- 
tary Ells,  with the exception of Bills on legislation relating to the mon- 
archy or the Royal Family, to obligations under international law and to 
financial provisions for office holders and their surviving relatives. 
The aukbr finds the first exception too general md fails to see any 
objection against a referendum to decide whether, in the absence of a 
legitimate successor to the throne, the consditutional monarchy should be 
preserved. 
An exception as to financial provisions for office holders and their 
surviving relativa is undesirable. In the past decades, government and 
parliament have net shown great wisdom in the matter. There is no reason 
to exclude the possibility of a referendum on such cases. 
Required Mqiarityfor Referenda 
In the opinion of the Biesheuvel Commission, a Bill passed by the Sdates- 
General could be rejected by referendum if this was done by a majority of 
not less than thirty per cenr of the electorate. A decision t&en bly the 
Pravincid Council or the Munilcipal Clovncil could be rejected by a 
majority consisting of noit less thanfsfi per c e ~ t  of the actual voters in the 
last Provincial or Municipal election. If an administrative decision were to 
be voted down by so few constituents, it would raise serious doubts as to 
the function of a referendum as a democratic meams of redress. The author 
argues that a proposal adopted by the States-General, the Provincial 
Council or the Municipal Council should only be voted down in a referen- 
d m  by a majority of not less thm forty-five per cent of the electorate. 
People's Initiative Issues 
In most cases, issues that may "la subjected to a referendum, c m  d s o  be 
the subj~ect of a people" initiative. Exceptions are general budget Bills. 
Under the Constitution, these must be introduced "by or in the name of the 
King." Far similar reasons, provincial and municipal budget proposals 
should dso  be exempt from being subjected to people's initiatives. 
Required Majority jbfleople Js Initiatives 
The Biesheuvel Comission's norms for accepting people" initiatives are 
gross0 m o b  the s m e  as those set by the same Cemlission in rdation to 
viating down administrative decisions by corrective referenda. The author 
proposes to increase the norm at all three electoral levels to a majority of 
not less than for@-five per cent of the electorate. In the case of a people's 
initiative to mend the Constitution, the norm should be a majority of not 
less than j5jFtli'-one percent of the electomre. 
Testing against the Constitution 
If people's initiatives are introduced, it is quite likely that legislative 
products are created that contravene the Netl~erlands Constitution, which is 
the more reason to grant Dutch courts the power to test Acts of Parliament 
against the Constitution. 
Translated by Lo~lise Rayar 
